India's Struggle to Tolerate the Intolerant:
Some Problems with Proselytizing
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This paper grows out of a workshop I attended some time back on the problem of 'proselytizing' in contemporary Asia.[1] The various presentations at the workshop focused on such notions as "proselytizing," "pluralism," "globalization" and "secularization." My own presentation had to do with India, and in this opening Prologue I want to offer three preliminary observations about my own presuppositions. First, I want to make clear how I am using the terms "proselytizing," "pluralism," "globalization," and "secularization." All four terms are clearly problematic and can be defined variously. It is not my intention, however, to debate these terms at the outset, but simply to stipulate how I shall be using these terms in my presentation that is focused on India. Second, proselytizing, in my view, encompasses a wide range of types of behavior, and I think that it is important for me to indicate how I understand these types. Third, given the title of my own presentation, "India's Struggle to Tolerate the Intolerant," I think that it is important to make clear what my position is regarding such notions as tolerance, impartiality and mutual respect.

First, then, some brief comments on how I understand the terminology. "Proselytizing," as I shall use the expression, is a purposeful human effort to induce someone to convert to another religious tradition or faith, either intramural or extramural, that is to say, either conversion within a given religion (from Roman Catholic to Protestant), or between religions (from Hindu to Christian). I prefer to avoid abstractions such as "proselytization" or "proseltytism," since I am interested primarily in the dynamic process of the effort, and, hence, my preference for the simple verbal adjective 'proselytizing."

In a similar fashion, I am inclined to use the term "pluralism" in a fairly specific sense. As Martin Marty has commented, there are three quite distinct notions of "pluralism" in common usage, which he has identified as "mere pluralism," "utter pluralism," and "civil pluralism."[2] "Mere pluralism" is the simple recognition in a given context that there are all sorts of things to be taken into account. "Utter pluralism" is an exasperated recognition in a given context that there are so many impulses, opinions or ideas floating about that it is seemingly impossible to find any basis for consensus. "Civil pluralism" is a sophisticated and tutored political recognition in a given social and political environment, allowing on one level the greatest possible diversity of views and life-styles, yet seeking on another level to identify those minimal conditions for order and communication that permit a mixed polity to survive. The United States with its separation of church and state, and India as a modern, secular nation-state, would both be examples of "civil pluralism," and it is this third sense of "pluralism" that I have in mind throughout my presentation.[3]

I also have an understanding of "globalization" that differs from the usual contemporary understanding. In much current discourse, globalization is understood to be largely an economic and/or sociological process having to do with the opening of global markets, free trade and the accompanying social changes that occur globally–for example, in the work of Jagdish Bhagwati, Roland Robertson, et al. I prefer a more historical understanding of globalization along the lines of "world-systems" analysis in the theoretical work of Ferdinand Braudel, Immanuel Wallerstein, et al. I discuss this in greater detail in the sequel.

My understanding of "secularization" also calls for a brief comment. Here I agree with the helpful specification that Jose Casanova makes clear in his book, *Public Religions in the Modern World*. Says Casanova,

> …what usually passes for a single theory of secularization is actually made up of three…very different propositions: secularization as differentiation of the secular spheres from religious institutions and norms, secularization as decline of religious beliefs and practices, and secularization as marginalization of religion to a privatized sphere.[4]

Here the first proposition, as Casanova clearly explains, cannot seriously be doubted in understanding contemporary social reality anywhere in the world, whereas the latter two propositions have been largely falsified in modern social reality.[5] Even if some modern nation-states do not allow a strict political separation of the secular from the religious, they all without exception fully operate with an awareness of the differentiation.

"On Tour." Bhil Mission, India. c. 1900. Lantern Slide. Image courtesy of what'sthatpicture.

Second, regarding the issue of types of proselytizing, I have constructed the following brief typology that has helped me in my attempt to get some sort of handle on the scope of proselytizing. I have found it helpful to identify four dichotomies, or perhaps better, four continua of types of proselytizing, as follows:

1. **Extramural** – one external tradition to another (e.g., Hindu to Christian) **vs. Intramural** – within one tradition (e.g., Roman Catholic to Pentecostal)
2. **Emissary** – speaking or preaching about (e.g., Protestant Christian) **vs. Exemplary** – showing by example (e.g., Hindu Guru, Buddhist Monk)
3. **Coercive** – violence, money, jobs (e.g., early Roman Catholic proselytizing in Goa) **vs. Persuasive** – sharing, convincing, persuading (e.g., modern church propagation), and
4. **Manifest** – upfront, open, explicit (e.g., Pentecostal proselytizing) **vs. Latent** – hidden, subversive, implicit (e.g., Christian schools, hospitals, welfare agencies).

The boundaries between these various types are often vague and overlapping; hence, my preference for construing these types as continua in contrast to fixed dichotomies.[6]

Third, I want to comment about the notion of tolerance. The crucial question that must always be posed to the proponents of tolerance, impartiality and mutual respect is simply: what to do with those who do not accept these values? This creates a dilemma, intellectual, moral and political, that is nearly impossible to resolve. Either one can tolerate the intolerant and thereby acquiesce in submission, or, one can refuse to tolerate the intolerant thereby unmasking that mutual respect and tolerance are finally constituted by what should not be tolerated. This is a dilemma in the sense that either solution, if pressed, makes the notion of "tolerance" problematic. Stanley Fish has argued persuasively that the problem is that notions such as "tolerance," "mutual respect," and so forth, are vacuous abstractions, and, hence, quite meaningless, unless given specific content. Says Fish,

…my argument is not that abstractions like tolerance, impartiality, and mutual respect are invalidated by exceptions to them, but that they are constituted–made operational and doable–by exceptions. That is, they exist only in the form made available by the (prior) exceptions and do not exist in the strong or pure form often assumed by those who recommend them.[7]

Fish comments further,

Those…who invoke tolerance or mutual respect (or fairness or equality or neutrality) typically claim to have sidestepped substance in favor of what Thomas Nagel calls a "higher order impartiality," a resolve not to hew to your strongly held moral and political views or try to institutionalize them, but rather to subordinate them to a proceduralism that renders them indistinguishable from the views of your opponents.[8]

I offer this methodological observation about "tolerance," and comparable abstract terms, at the outset of my presentation, not simply to agree with Stanley Fish, but rather to make clear that I am inclined to make a substance claim regarding the subject matter of "proselytizing," namely, my view that much religious proselytizing, whether of a traditional Christian, Islamic, Buddhist, Hindu or Jewish sort, or, of a quasi-religious sort–for example, secular-ism, scient-ism, and so forth–is prima facie worrisome in twenty-first century social reality and in many instances bears the not insignificant burden of having to be accountable intellectually, morally and politically. I am not arguing that a religious group or secular ideology should not have the right to proselytize. Any religious view or secular ideology, of course, has the right to be presented by its adherents. Toleration and respect, however, and continuing access to the public space of contemporary social reality for proselytizing can only be encouraged when all of the various groups seeking to proselytize recognize that proselytizing is a privilege that can only operate in a climate wherein all participants play by the same rules of open exchange and mutual forbearance. If a proselytizing group cannot accept open exchange and mutual forbearance, and insists on exclusivist, absolutist, or coercive claims, then such a group deserves to be challenged. To put it directly, given the dilemma mentioned above, I accept the second horn of the dilemma that "tolerance" or "mutual respect" only become relevant when we are clear in our own minds about what we should **not** be willing to tolerate.

In what follows, then, I shall be looking at three types of proselytizing in India, namely, Islamic terrorist groups, Christian Pentecostal and/or charismatic groups, and certain varieties of Sangh Parivar (conservative or right-wing extremist Hindu groups). In terms of my typology mentioned above, all three types of groups represent proselytizing that is **Extramural-cum-Intramural** (calling both for internal conversion within a tradition as well as proselytizing for conversion from one religion to another), largely **Emissary** (in the Weberian sense), often **Coercive**, and for the most part **Manifest**. Moreover, all three types of groups in India are, in my view, possible threats to the existence of the **civil pluralism** characteristic of the modern **secular** Indian nation-state. I shall be arguing that they are "anti-systemic" groups in terms of Wallerstein's **"world-systems"** notion of **globalization** and that it is important to examine the claims of these groups and carefully to be aware of how their actions may have a negative impact on the democratic polity of contemporary India.

Terrorist Groups and Religious Groups

The U.S. Department of State maintains a list of terrorist groups, and it is instructive to note how that list has changed over the past forty years. In 1968, there were eleven known terrorist groups, but none was associated with a religious group. By 1995 some fifty terrorist groups were identified, and about twelve of them (just over 20%) appear to have had religious motivations. By 2004 there was a list of some seventy-seven terrorist groups, and forty (over 50%) were identified as having religious motivations. About ten of these are found in South Asia, including India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal and Sri Lanka. Among the forty with religious motivations thirty-seven were Islamic in orientation.[9] As is generally well known, especially since the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, there has been a resurgence of militant Islamic groups, some of which are terrorist, throughout Asia, Africa and the various Diaspora communities in Europe and North America.

It is equally instructive to chart the growth of Christian groups over the same period. In 1900 there were approximately twenty-two (22) million Christians in Asia (inclusive of South, East, Southeast and West

Asia).[10] By 1970 there were one hundred one (101) million. By 2005 the number had increased to three hundred fifty-one (351) million. In terms of the entire world, the number of Christians has grown to roughly two billion, but as Nicholas D. Kristof of the *New York Times* (on 3/4/2003, A27) has wryly pointed out, "…the boom is not among tweedy Presbyterians but among charismatic Pentecostalists." Through much of the twentieth century, the Roman Catholic Church has grown by hardly more than 1%. Orthodox Christian traditions and Classical Protestant traditions (sometimes called "mainline" Protestant traditions, such as the "tweedy Presbyterians" mentioned just above) have systematically declined through the decades. Protestant Evangelical Christianity, on the other hand, has grown by a full 10% so that Protestant Evangelical Christianity now makes up the largest segment of world Christianity after Roman Catholicism with estimates ranging between 600 million and 750 million worldwide.[11]

At first glance, it may appear to be a category error to discuss largely Islamic terrorist groups with Evangelical Christian groups. Such a comparison, however, I am inclined to think, may prove to be helpfully diagnostic in getting a handle on the problematic of the relation between "proselytizing," "religious pluralism" and "globalization." Proselytizing has been particularly notable and worrisome among jihadist/militant Islamist groups and Christian Evangelical groups in contentious pluralist environments such as Israel, Iran, the Arab states, Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Malaysia, and Indonesia. In my view, this is no accident, and it may be illuminating to understand the relation(s) between Islamist terrorist groups and Evangelical Christian groups.

Oftentimes, Islamic militant groups and charismatic Evangelical groups are dismissed as being "theocratic," "fundamentalist," and "anti-modern," but such a characterization is seriously misleading. As Peter Berger has argued in regard to "born again" Evangelicals, all three terms miss the mark. If by "theocratic" is meant the imposition of a religious polity on an entire society, Evangelicals have no such intentionality; if by "fundamentalist" is meant an "aggressive fanatic," the typical Evangelical cannot be so described; and if by "anti-modern" is meant the absence of individual choice in religion or the rejection of technology and "rationalization" (in the Weberian sense), the Evan-

gelical is quintessentially "modern" rather than "anti-modern."[12]

Berger, of course, has a well-known bias for conservative Christian religiosity and politics, and it appears not to have occurred to him that the same arguments he offers for defending Evangelicals against the charges of "theocratic," "fundamentalist," and "anti-modern" apply in a parallel manner, *mutatis mutandis*, to many Islamic terrorist groups. In other words, just as "theocratic," "fundamentalist" and "anti-modern" are unhelpful adjectives for analytically understanding Evangelicals, the same can be said for jihadist/militant Islamist terrorists. Some extremist Islamist groups, to be sure, include totalitarian fanatics that seek to reconstitute a pre-modern (or "neo-traditionalist") Islamic caliphate, but such is a oversimplification or caricature of the groups overall. Many militant Islamist groups, for example, have goals that are quite modern, such as independence for Kashmir, the formation of an independent Palestinian state, resolution of regional grievances between Muslims and tribals in the Northeastern states of India and in Bangladesh, and so forth. Many members of Islamic terrorist groups are highly educated professionals with a sophisticated understanding of Islamic traditions. Many are likewise knowledgeable about modern technology and are capable in using the techniques of modern communication. To dismiss the Islamist terrorist groups as "theocratic," "fundamentalist," and "anti-modern" is often to engage in little more than name-calling. To be clear, my point here is not to defend Islamic terrorist groups. It is only to say that they are most certainly **not** "theocratic," "fundamentalist" and "anti-modern."

Characteristics of Islamic Terrorist Groups and Evangelical Christian Groups

If Islamic terrorist groups and Evangelical Christian groups are not "theocratic," "fundamentalist," and "anti-modern," what, then, **are** they? Here again I find it useful to use Berger's idiom with respect to the Evangelicals as a starting-point, but then to recast his analysis in relation to Islamic terrorist groups. In many of the surveys of contemporary Evangelical groups, for example, the work of Paul Freston, David Lumsdaine, Timothy S. Shah, et al., Evangelical movements are said to have four constant characteristics:

1. conversionism (the "born again" experience);
2. activism (proselytizing, missionizing);

3. biblicism (centrality of the Bible); and

4. crucicentrism (focus on the crucifixion of Jesus).[13]

Berger reworks this standard listing and while acknowledging that there is no "Evangelical Vatican" to help in indentifying salient characteristics, offers six characteristics in general for Evangelicals, plus three additional characteristics for specifically Pentecostal Evangelicals, as follows:

1. Belief in a cosmic drama of redemption, beyond ordinary experience (or, as Berger puts it, a "supernaturalist understanding"), centered in the person of Jesus Christ;

2. The Bible (OT and NT) as authoritative for faith and life;

3. Belief in the efficacy of prayer;

4. Personal experience of conversion–being "born again";

5. Evangelism–missionary proselytizing to all people;

6. A strict moral code; and the three additional characteristics for Pentecostals,

7. Glossalalia–"speaking in tongues";

8. Focus on spiritual healing; and

9. Charismatic leadership.[14]

Among these six (or nine) characteristics, if one includes Pentecostals within the larger grouping, it would appear that items (3) and (4) appear to go together with items (7) and (8), that is, a personal spirituality of "born again" conversion that includes an active prayer life and under some circumstances "speaking in tongues" and spiritual healing. One might suggest, then, that Berger's characterization of Evangelicalism can be reduced to five characteristics:

1. Belief in a cosmic drama of redemption, beyond ordinary experience centering in the person of Jesus Christ;

2. Bible of the OT and NT as authoritative for faith and life;

3. "Born again" personal conversion spirituality (that may include "speaking in tongues" and rituals for "healing").

4. Evangelistic missionary proselytizing to all people; and

5. Charismatic leadership.

Berger's characterization, however, although noting wryly that Evangelicals have no "Vatican," leaves out what is clearly an additional notable essential feature of Evangelical movements, that is, that they are for the most part not only sub-state or transnational, but also reluctant to be included among the standard or so-called "mainline" denominational churches. In other words, they are usually free-floating, "non-denominational" associations. This would then be a sixth characteristic.

Next, in order to characterize specifically Islamic terrorist groups, it is, first of all, useful to have at least some sense of the characteristics of terrorism in general. Louise Richardson's *What Terrorists Want* provides the following listing as follows:

1. Terrorism involves politically motivated acts;

2. Violence or the threat of violence is always a component;

3. Terrorism is meant to send a message;

4. Acts of terrorism have symbolic significance;

5. Terrorist groups are sub-state or transnational–not directly linked to nation-states;

6. Victims of violence and the audience for violence are not the same; and

7. Deliberate use of violence against civilians as a fundamental strategy.[15]

Among these seven characteristics, items (2), (6) and (7) appear to belong together, that is, the essential feature of violence. In a similar manner, items (1), (3), and (4) probably belong together. That is, terrorism as a political act is meant to send a symbolic message. One might suggest, then, that the basic features of terrorism can be reduced to three:

1. Terrorism involves symbolic political acts designed to send a message;

2. Via the use of violence or the threat of violence that targets civilians; and

3. Perpetrated by sub-state or transnational groups, which operate apart from nation-states.

Characteristics that would be relevant for identifying terrorism as "Islamic" would be the following three:

1. Belief in a cosmic drama of redemption, beyond ordinary experience, centering on submission (*islam*) to the will of God (Allah) as set forth in the message of the supreme prophet, Muhammad;

2. Quran and its Sharia (law) as authoritative for faith and life; and

3. Jihad or "struggle" to extend and defend the "House of Islam" (*dar al-Islam*) among all people.

Combining, then, the basic characteristics of terrorism in general with the specific characteristics that determine an "Islamic" inflection, specifically "Islamic terrorism" includes the following:

1. Belief in a cosmic drama of redemption, beyond ordinary experience, focused on submission to the will of God as set forth in the message of the supreme prophet, Muhammad.
2. Quran and its Sharia (law) as authoritative for faith and life;
3. Jihad or "struggle" to extend and defend the "House of Islam" (*dar al-Islam*) among all people;
4. Use of symbolic political acts to send a message;
5. Via the use of violence or the threat of violence that targets civilians; and
6. Perpetrated by sub-state or transnational groups, which operate apart from nation-states.

Assuming that such taxonomies are reasonably accurate and fair, if Evangelical groups are then compared and contrasted with Islamic Terrorist groups, some obvious and striking commonalities appear, *mutatis mutandis*: a cosmic drama of redemption (or, to use Berger's idiom, a "supernaturalist understanding"); authority based on a specific sacred book; proselytizing and/or missionizing across international boundaries; and sub-state or transnational (or "non-denominational") associations that operate apart from nation-states, secular non-governmental organizations and conventional or "mainline" churches. In addition, Evangelical groups and Islamist Terrorist groups share the common feature of being for the most part "outsiders" in terms of the contemporary global world-system and, more than that, subsist in contexts of asymmetric "weakness." Both types of groups are highly suspect by the established elites in the various nation-states (including the United States), and both types of groups are suspect by the religious traditions from which they come, Sunni, Shia, and Sufi in the case of mainstream Islamic traditions, and Roman Catholic, Orthodox Christian and Classical Protestant mainline traditions in Europe and the United States, in the case of Evangelicals. It is no accident that both types of groups are prominent and growing rapidly in those areas of the world that represent for the most part the periphery or semi-periphery of the contemporary world-system: the Middle East, Latin America, Africa, South and Southeast Asia. Both types of groups reject the contemporary secular world-order and represent constituencies that feel aggrieved, disenchanted, disillusioned and disempowered by that world. In the case of Islamist terrorist groups, the Great Satan is the world-order established by the hegemonic power of the United States. In the case of the Evangelicals, the Great Satan is literally the Great Satan!

There is, of course, one apparently glaring difference between Evangelicalism and Islamic Terrorism, and that is the matter of politically motivated violence. The former focuses on "born again" conversion, the life of prayer, speaking-in-tongues, healing and the salvation that comes through a personal relationship with Jesus Christ. The latter focuses on political action that makes explicit use of violence against the innocent for the sake of making a political statement and for eventually bringing about a world-system based on Islamic Sharia.[16]

It should perhaps be mentioned here, however, that Christian Pentecostal groups in more than a few instances have been involved in the direct use of violence. Paul Freston, in a fascinating article, "The Changing Face of Christian Proselytization: New Actors from the Global South," has described a variety of uses of violence by Pentecostals in Africa, Latin America and India in the section of his essay entitled "Evangelicals and Violence."[17] Also, Eliza Grizwold's *The Tenth Parallel: Dispatches from the Fault Line Between Christianity and Islam*, looks at the frequently violent encounters between Christian Evangelicals and Muslims in countries along the line of latitude about seven hundred miles north of the equator that runs through Africa, South and Southeast Asia and the Philippines, along which over a billion Muslims and 60% of the two billion Christians in the world reside and continuously interact.[18]

But let me pull together what I have been trying to argue thus far. I am not arguing that Islamist terrorist groups and Evangelical religious groups exhibit the same intentionality, that, in other words, Evangelicals are "really" terrorists, or, to the contrary, that Islamist terrorists are in some sense "really" evangelicals. My argument is more along the lines of Weberian "elective affinity." There are some striking characteristics that suggest that although the intentionalities of the two sets of groups differ markedly, both historically and ideologically, there are certain affinities that bring these groups together in an interesting fashion, namely: (a) an exclusivist cosmic drama of redemption; (b) a

sacred text that reveals the meaning of the cosmic drama and is authoritative for faith and life; (c) a powerful experience of having been personally transformed into becoming a participant in the cosmic drama of redemption, (d) a deep dissatisfaction with the current secular world-system; (e) a strong sense that a new community of faith is possible that transcends existing institutional boundaries, whether those of the current system of nation-states, non-governmental organizations, or conventional churches and/or denominations; (f) that this possible new community is only incipient and weak currently but has the promise of becoming a new world-system, (g) that one has a strong personal urge to proselytize and seek converts, by personal persuasion if possible, but coercively and with violence in some instances if the power of the current world-system makes it impossible for the emerging new community to survive, and, finally (h) a conviction so strong as to the truth of this living faith and community that one is willing to give up everything, including one's own personal life, for its progressive realization.

These eight characteristics, in my view, are essential for understanding the texture of proselytizing religious groups in our time. I have focused on Islamist terrorist groups and Evangelical religious groups because they seem to me to be especially salient in our own time, a time that can be dated from what *Time* magazine in 1976 called "The Year of the Evangelicals," when the Evangelical, Jimmy Carter, was elected President of the United States, and was soon to confront the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, through the fall of the Soviet Union in 1989, and coming down to the tragedy of 9/11, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the war on terror, and the current uncertainty in the world-system because of the Great Recession through which we are currently living throughout the world. More-

"Prevailing Religions of the British Indian Empire, 1909" from the *Imperial Gazetteer of India*, Oxford University Press, 1909.

over, I have also focused on Islamist terrorist groups and Evangelical religious groups, since these types of religious groups are salient features in the social reality of contemporary India (and, as mentioned earlier, widely in South and Southeast Asia and the Middle East generally).

Some years ago (1995) I published a book entitled, *India's Agony Over Religion* in which I examined India as a modern "secular" state and the manner in which "secular" India has struggled to deal with the issues of strident religiosity and proselytizing.[19] Since that time, Islamic terrorist groups (usually based in Pakistan) have become much more prominent in India's social reality, as have Evangelical religious groups (in the south, west and northeast of India), and, of course, as have the various groups that make up the so-called "Sangh Parivar", the constellation of conservative (rightist) Hindu or Hindutva nationalist groups, including the RSS (*Rashtriya Svayamsevak Sangh* or National Assembly of Volunteers), the VHP (*Vishva Hindu Parishad* or World Council of Hindus), the political party known as the BJP (Bharatiya Janata Party, Indian People's Party) and a number of other conservative rightist groups.

If the United States has been undergoing a terrible "war on terrorism" since 9/11 that has evolved into two major wars (in Iraq and Afghanistan) and a polarization of American social and political life between "blue" (left-leaning "progressive" traditions) and "red" (right-leaning "tea party" traditions), India has traveled an equally terrible path, in many ways more brutal and violent than anything that the U.S. has experienced. Striking, of course, is that these conflicts in India (and elsewhere), while being obviously, even primarily, political (and military) conflicts, are also deeply religious conflicts, involving Muslims, Christians and Hindus, from sub-groups within the respective larger religious traditions that are strident in their proselytizing, that is, Islamic terrorist groups, Evangelical religious groups and some of the groups within the Sangh Parivar

Globalization, the Current World-System and Modern India

Before looking at India in greater detail, however, and the manner in which the secular Indian nation-state has been dealing with these issues of proselytizing and strident religiosity, let me say just a further word about how I prefer to deal with the notion of what is usually called "globalization." As mentioned briefly at the outset, what I have in mind is neither the recent theorizing (since about 1980) about "globalization" by economists such as Jagdish Bhagwati in which the term refers primarily to the manner in which national economies interact through capital flows, migration, and foreign direct investment as a result of the elimination of regulation and the opening of global markets, and so forth; nor is what I have mind the theorizing about "globalization" by sociologists such as Roland Robertson in which social reality changes through the interaction of global shifts in ideas and language that generates a contrary process of what has been called "glocalization", and so forth.[20] Both, of course, are thoughtful social scientific analyses of the current global order, but, in my view, a more analytically powerful orientation is the "world-systems" analysis of Immanuel Wallerstein.[21] "World-systems" analysis takes a longer view, usually traced to the idea of the "*longue durée*" in Ferdinand Braudel's historical research on the Mediterranean region, in which the analyst looks for long-term cycles and trends, sometimes centuries long, through which "world-empires" or "world-systems" unfold. A "world-empire" would be, for example, the Roman Empire or the Mughal Empire.

According to Wallerstein, the modern "world-system" and/or the modern "world-economy" is a capitalist network or system, made up of multiple political centers and multiple cultures and a distinctive division of labor involving "core" states, "semi-peripheral" states and "peripheral" states. The focus in world-systems analysis is not the nation-state system but, rather, the network of relations between "core"-production (advanced goods, high technology, and so forth) and the "periphery" (raw materials to be used by the core, and so forth) and the "semi-periphery," which mediates production processes. The modern capitalist world-system came into being in the sixteenth century, underwent important changes during the French Revolution in the late eighteenth century and, again, in the world revolutions in Europe in 1848. The most recent shifts in the modern world-system in the twentieth century are the revolutions of 1968, the fall of the Soviet Union in 1989, and the onset of the Great Recession through which we have recently passed (or, possibly, still passing) at the present time.

Of great significance in world-systems analysis is what Wallerstein calls "anti-systemic movements." These are social movements within the division of labor world-system, in which excluded constituencies begin to organize in order to be included in a more balanced way, politically, socially, and economically, within the world-system. The original "anti-systemic movement" was the industrial working-class and the emergent labor unions, but many others developed as well (for example, women's groups, and religious, language, ethnic groups, and so forth). These groups, while by definition "anti-systemic," nevertheless helped consolidate the capitalist world-system of the twentieth century, at least until the revolutions of 1968 and the fall of the Soviet Union in 1989, when it became clear that the older "anti-systemic movements" were being seriously criticized and undermined.

I wish to suggest that Islamic terrorist groups and Evangelical religious groups are "anti-systemic movements" in Wallerstein's sense, as are, for that matter, some of the groups that make up the Sangh Parivar in contemporary India. These groups in India, it seems to me, are directly challenging the modern "secular" nation-state of India. Islamic terrorist groups, representing the alienated and oppressed Muslims of India, are challenging India's place in the contemporary world-system. Currently India would be considered a "semi-periphery" player in the world-system division of labor, and Islamic terrorist groups not only wish to re-align the State of Jammu and Kashmir with Pakistan, but, in addition, to bring down secular India within the world-system in favor of an alternative world-system (or perhaps "world-empire"), a transnational Islamic Empire. Evangelical charismatic religious groups in India, representing primarily Dalits (Scheduled Castes) and tribals (Scheduled Tribes), are challenging the modern Indian "secular" state's identity.[22] The Evangelical religious "anti-systemic groups" to which I refer are **not** the mainline churches and denominations of pre-independence Christian missions (Roman Catholic, Orthodox, Classical Protestant, and so forth), which have largely acquiesced in the Neo-Hindu ideology of the "secular" state, but, rather, the Evangelical charismatic Pentecostal groups that have been politically active in recent years in the south and west of India but primarily in the Northeast, that is, the Christian majority states of Nagaland, Meghalaya and Mizoram. Evangelical groups, for example, would seek to undo the entire framework of "compensatory discrimination," which is not only demeaning to the beneficiaries of compensation by perpetuating the very system it wishes to undermine, but which is also profoundly, in their view, anti-Christian. Finally, I think that some members of the Sangh Parivar, apart, of course, from the largely moderate and fully legitimate conservative orientation in the BJP ideology of A. B. Vajpayee and L. K. Advani, are, in the RSS and VHP and Bajrang Dal manifestations, a serious threat directed at the heart of the modern Indian secular state.[23] Sangh Parivar extremist groups proselytize among the middle class for a conversion away from the Gandhian Nehruvian secular state towards a more radical Hindutva ideology, and they proselytize among Muslims and Christians for re-conversion back to Hindu religion, and if not that, acceptance of a second-class status that maintains obeisance to Hindu India.

India's Struggle with Proselytizing

In my view, these three types of "anti-systemic movements" in contemporary India are very serious threats to the very existence of India as a modern nation-state. Non-denominational or loosely denominational Evangelical charismatic Pentecostal religious groups are strong, as might be expected, in the majority northeastern Christian states of Nagaland, Meghalaya and Mizoram, but they are also present in the area of Goa and Gujarat in western India and through much of south India. They work primarily among Dalits (Untouchables or Scheduled Castes), who make up about 15% of the population of India), and tribals (Scheduled Tribes), who make up 7.5% of the population. Their target groups, in other words, amount to nearly 25% of the population of modern India (equivalent to just over 250,000,000). While Christians overall are only about 2.5% of the population of India (roughly 20 to 25,000,000), it is difficult to ascertain even approximate statistics for Evangelical charismatic Pentecostals. They are only beginning to be studied in a careful way in such efforts as the Project for Evangelical Christianity and Democracy in the Global South, chaired by Timothy Samuel Shah, which has thus far sponsored the publication of some four volumes.[24] In serious social science scholarship in India, unfortunately, little work has been done on Evangelical groups. There is a vast and excellent bibliography in Indian social scientific writing regarding "secularism," but little or very little about Evangelical Pentecostal movements. Rowena Robinson has com-

mented on the paucity of scholarship and has offered the following observation about Evangelical Pentecostals in India.

> It is not clear how the Charismatic movement came to India or became widespread here. It appears that the movement was already in existence by the middle [of the twentieth century] among Christians in major cities and other urban areas. In Goa, the movement grew out of its original restriction to small groups of Catholics. These were probably influenced by the teachings of charismatic groups who came from outside Goa, possibly from nearby cities as Mumbai and Pune. In south India, it appears that sectarian Pentecostal groups have been in action for many years. A significant presence of Pentecostals was reported from south India in the 1920s and 1930s. The movement grew after the Second World War and by the 1980s there seem to have been a large number of congregations of Pentecostals.[25]

Some important fieldwork has been done recently in India among Evangelical groups, for example, Sushil J. Aaron's work in the Dangs region of Gujarat (the forest areas of the tribals in southern Gujarat) by the Evangelical Gujarat Christian Workers movement.[26] Also, there is the work of Sujatha Fernandes among radical Evangelical movements in the northeastern Christian majority states of Nagaland, Meghalaya and Mizoram.[27] It is interesting to note that the Sangh Parivar is fully aware of the proselytizing in Gujarat and the Northeastern states and has been pushing reconversion proselytizing in these areas as well as attempts to encourage the so-called "Indianisation of the Church," which, of course, is more than a little odd in view of the fact that Christianity has been part of Indian social reality since the first centuries of the CE![28]

Turning to "anti-systemic movements" of the Islamic terrorist variety, seven groups are regularly mentioned in the media. These represent proselytizing that is secret, insidious, illegal and dedicated probably in most instances to the disintegration of India as a modern nation-state. Most of these operate out of Pakistan and target primarily the State of Jammu and Kashmir in India.[29]

Perhaps most frequently mentioned is **Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT)** ("The Army of the Pure"), founded in Pakistan in 1986 to fight the Soviets in Afghanistan. The current leader is Hafiz M. Sayeed. In more recent years the group has been directly involved in extensive terrorist acts in Kashmir and other parts of India, and it has been directly implicated in the vicious attacks in Mumbai on November 26, 2008.

Almost equally as well known is **Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM)** ("The Army of Muhammad"), founded in 2000, also in Pakistan. The group's current leader is Maulana Masood Azhar, and the group is alleged to have perpetrated the attack on the Indian Parliament on December 13, 2001.

Also founded in Pakistan (in 1989) is **Harkat-ul-Jihad-i-Islam (HuJI)** ("Islamic Struggle Movement"), under the current leadership of Qari Saifullah Akhtar. This group targets Kashmir primarily, and also coordinates its activities with LeT and JeM.

Hizbul Mujahideen (HuM) ("Party of Holy Warriors" or "Justice-Fighters"), founded in 1989 and currently under the leadership of Mohammed Yusuf Shah, aka Syed Salahuddin. The group was formed initially to combat the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front, which seeks independence for Kashmir. The HuM, on the contrary, wants Kashmir to be integrated with Pakistan.

Indian Mujahideen (IM) ("Indian Justice-fighters" or "Holy Warriors"), founded in 2005 as the first home-grown terrorist group in India, by Amir Raza Khan. This group is alleged to have perpetrated bomb attacks in Varanasi, Delhi, Jaipur, Ahmedabad and elsewhere and to have been involved in the Mumbai attacks in November 2008.

Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI), founded by students from Aligarh University, Uttar Pradesh, in 1977. Its current leader is Safdar Nagori. The group allegedly works regularly with the Indian Mujahideen as well as LeT.

Finally, **the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA)**, founded in 1979, and under the current leadership of Paresh Barua. This group is alleged to have perpetrated bombing attacks throughout Assam and is said to be working out of bases in Bangladesh. The group seeks independence for Assam and is one of many insurgent groups in the northeastern states (on analogy with comparable insurgent groups among Evangelical "anti-systemic groups").

Tolerating the Intolerant in Contemporary India

I have been discussing three distinct types of proselytizing in present-day India: Islamic-terrorist proselytizing, Evangelical Christian proselytizing and Sangh Parivar proselytizing. All three types represent (a) attempts at conversion, (b) targeting specific populations, and (c) seeking a particular absolutist/political goal. In the case of Islamic terrorist proselytizing, the target populations are the Muslim communities in general (altogether making up well over 100,000,000 people) and the Muslim majority in the State of Jammu and Kashmir in particular. Young alienated adults, both educated and uneducated, are recruited or "converted" for terrorist acts designed to undermine the integrity of the modern nation-state of India, ostensibly for the limited goal of bringing about the separation of Kashmir from the Indian Union but also for the larger goal of attaining a transnational Islamic "world-empire" distinct from the present capitalist world-system. In the case of Evangelical Christian proselytizing, the target populations are the huge groups of impoverished Dalits and tribals in the northeastern States (the so-called Seven Sisters, Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland and Tripura, but especially the Christian majority states of Nagaland, Meghalaya and Mizoram) as well as Dalit and tribal populations in the west (Goa, Gujarat, and so forth) and the south (Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu) (altogether making up well over 250,000,000 people). Again, young alienated adults, both educated and uneducated, are recruited or "converted" for political action, ostensibly aimed at arousing a radical awareness of the massive inequity and discrimination of civil society in the modern nation-state of India but also for the larger goal of sharing in a new transnational Kingdom of God centering in the person of Jesus Christ. These groups for the most part operate quite apart from the conventional churches and denominations, which have all compromised with the Neo-Hindu Gandhian-Nehruvian "secular" modern nation-state of India. In the case of the extremist groups among the Sangh Parivar, the target populations are the "Hindi heartland" of north and central India, (Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Haryana, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, Gujurat and Maharashtra), but more specifically, the new urban, predominantly Hindu middle class (altogether making up as many as 250,000,000),

higher caste groups just below the elites or highest levels of civil and national leadership, that is, lower government bureaucrats, middle management types, business entrepreneurs, and so forth, who, though reasonably prosperous, feel alienated and discriminated against by reason of the massive system of "compensatory discrimination" that amounts, in their view, to "giving the minorities what they want" and ignoring the needs of the overwhelming Hindu majority. Young students and highly educated young professionals are recruited or "converted" into disciplined cadres (in the RSS and the VHP) of pro-Hindu activists who are committed to an absolutist/political ideology of "Hindu-tva" (Hindu-ness) who wish to take power and who are anti-Muslim and anti-Christian to the point of perpetrating direct acts of violence against Muslim communities (for example, the Gujarat pogrom in 2002 in which as many as 2000 Muslims, men, women and children were brutally killed) and against Christian communities (the burning of churches and acts of violence against mission workers).

The Secular Nation-State of Modern India

According to the Constitutions of India, officially adopted on 26 January 1950, the issues of freedom of religion and proselytizing are dealt with as follows:

> Article 25:
>
> (1) Subject to public order, morality and health and to the other provisions of this Part, all persons are equally entitled to freedom of conscience and the right freely to **profess, practise and propagate religion."**
>
> (2) Nothing in this article shall affect the operation of any existing law or prevent the State from making any law–
>
>> (a) regulating or restricting any economic, financial, political or other secular activity which may be associated with religious practice;
>>
>> (b) providing for social welfare and reform, or the throwing open of Hindu religious institutions of a public character to all classes and sections of Hindus.
>
> Explanation I: the wearing and carrying of kirpans [daggers] shall be deemed to be included in the profession of Sikh religion.
>
> Explanation II: In sub-class (b) of clause (2), the reference to Hindus shall be construed as includ-

ing a reference to persons professing the Sikh, Jain or Buddhist religion, and the reference to Hindu religious institutions shall be construed accordingly.

Article 26:

Subject to public order, morality and health, every religious denomination or any section thereof shall have the right–

> (a) to establish and maintain institutions for religious and charitable purposes;
>
> (b) to manage its own affairs in matters of religion;
>
> (c) to own and acquire movable and immovable property; and
>
> (d) to administer such property in accordance with law."[30]

As might well be imagined, the issue of "propagation" was vigorously debated in the Constituent Assembly that began its work in January 1947. Two Subcommittees, the Sub-Committee on Fundamental Rights and the Minorities Sub-Committee both addressed the issue of "propagation" and whether propagation included the right to "conversion." The Sub-Committee on Fundamental Rights recommended the following: "Conversions from one religion to another brought about by coercion or undue influence should not be recognized by law." The Minorities Sub-Committee, however, which had some Christians as members, recommended that there should be legal provision for the propagation of religion and conversion.[31] After much debate, a final decision was taken in favor of propagation. T. N. Madan describes the final outcome as follows:

> Eventually some highly respected and articulate members of the Constituent Assembly put their weight behind the acceptance of the wording in the draft. The right to convert, it was pointed out, would surely not be employed in a divisive manner by the Indian Christians, who had generally been with the mainstream during the national movement. Moreover, the right would be available to every community that believes in propagation, such as the Arya Samaj. And so Article 25, as we know it today, became part of the fundamental rights chapter of the Constitution of India.[32]

The vexing question, of course, arising again and again up to the present moment, is whether "propaga-

tion" means "proselytizing" up through and including "conversion." Various States in the Indian Union (for example, Orissa in 1967, Madhya Pradesh in 1968, Arunachal Pradesh in 1978, and Tamil Nadu most recently in 2002) have passed legislation against "conversion." The Orissa Freedom of Religion Act (1967) says, "Conversion in its very process involves an act of undermining another faith. This process becomes all the more objectionable when this is brought about by recourse to methods like force, fraud, material inducement and exploitation of one's poverty, simplicity and ignorance."[33] Arunachal Pradesh in its Freedom of Religion Act prohibits conversion from "indigenous faiths" to "any other faith or religion by use of force or inducement or by fraudulent means."[34] T. N. Madan points out, "Since 'nature worshippers' as well as Buddhists and Vaishnavas were identified as followers of indigenous faiths, the prohibition affected the proselytizing activities of the Christian missionaries alone."[35] When the issue came before the Supreme Court of India, in January 1977 Chief Justice A. N. Ray, ruled that "conversion" is not included within the notion of "propagation," commenting that "what is freedom for one, is freedom for the other, in equal measure, and there can, therefore, be no such thing as a fundamental right to convert another person to one's own religion," because doing so "would impinge on the 'freedom of conscience' guaranteed to all the citizens of the country alike" (AIR, Supreme Court, 1977: 908-12).[36] This, of course, is hardly a clear ruling, but it seems to suggest that "propagation" is caring for one's own religious tradition and perhaps sharing one's beliefs when asked but that there is "…no such thing as a fundamental right to convert another person to one's own religion." As is the case with so much else in the modern nation-state of India, there is in these various debates and declarations about "propagation" and "conversion," what Granville Austin has called "…the ability to reconcile, to harmonize, and to make work without changing their content, apparently incompatible concepts…"; and what Marc Galanter has called a commendable "principled eclecticism" and a "tempered legalism" that allows for religious pluralism and diversity without making clear what cannot be tolerated.[37]

At the outset of this article I referred to a "…dilemma, intellectual, moral and political, that is nearly impossible to resolve. Either one can tolerate the intolerant and thereby acquiesce in submission, or, one

can refuse to tolerate the intolerant thereby unmasking that mutual respect and tolerance are finally constituted by what cannot be tolerated." I agreed with Stanley Fish that it "…is not that abstractions like tolerance, impartiality, and mutual respect are invalidated by exceptions to them, but that they are constituted–made operational and doable–by exceptions," and I concluded with the comment "… that 'tolerance' or 'mutual respect' only become relevant when we are clear in our own minds about what we should **not** be willing to tolerate."

Conclusion

Michael Walzer, in an article entitled "Governing the Globe" sets forth a sevenfold typology of various possible world-systems, a continuum ranging from a highly centralized unified world state, or a "world republic," on the extreme far left, to a loose system of "international anarchy" and decentralization, on the extreme far right.[38] In the article he offers critical comments about each of the types, and he does so by utilizing four fundamental criteria for evaluation, based on the capacity of these various world-systems to promote (a) **peace**; (b) **distributive justice**; (c) **cultural pluralism**; and (d) **individual freedom**. One might argue that the warrant for such fundamental values are historically derived largely from the Enlightenment, have no essential grounding philosophically, and must simply be accepted pragmatically and should be pursued without apology because they have been shown to work reasonably well–in other words, a pragmatism of the Richard Rorty sort. Or, to the contrary, as I am inclined to think, one might argue that a careful and thoughtful reading of the history of religions can find precisely the same fundamental values at the center of authentic Jewish faith, Islamic piety, Christian self-giving love, Hindu meditation, Buddhist enlightenment, and any of the other living spiritualities throughout the world.

What one cannot plausibly argue, in my view, is that the absence of any one of these values is conducive to the success of any conceivable world-system. Fantasies of violence and war, unfair inequities among and between people, a single cultural system that undermines other cultures, and the denial of personal freedom, cannot be plausibly warranted among thoughtful people or between communities of people in our contemporary world. "Anti-systemic" proselytizing groups that reject or undermine any one of these should

be identified as dysfunctional aberrations that should be rigorously criticized and politically opposed.

Much more needs to be said, of course, by way of spelling out in detail how the values of peace, distributive justice, cultural pluralism and individual freedom might be cultivated, but I am inclined to argue that Islamic terrorist groups, Evangelical insurgent groups and extremist Sangh Parivar cadres are the *exceptions* that constitute what we might mean by a substantive notion of tolerance and mutual respect. In other words, such groups reveal what should not be tolerated so that tolerance and mutual respect, instead of being vacuous abstractions, can have some substantive meaning within a "civil pluralism" that has a reasonable chance to flourish.

Let me hasten to add immediately that I am not suggesting any sort of state prohibition against proselytizing in general (apart, of course, from proselytizing that is clearly criminal, as is the case with all of Islamic terrorist activity, some Evangelical activity and some Sangh Parivar activities). Identifying what should not be tolerated is a political task primarily for civil society. T. N. Madan puts the matter well.

It seems that the time is now opportune to argue forcefully that the best guardian of freedom of religion, and the most effective guarantor that unfair conversions, particularly on a collective basis, shall not take place, will be not the state but civil society, or, better still, the two in association. Vigilant public opinion expressed in institutional ways, acting as a monitor rather than a substitute, should be preferable to executive authority, particularly if this is to be exercised by the lower rungs of the bureaucracy and magistracy…. This is at the moment only an idea: it will need serious effort to work it out, particularly if communal dissensions are acute as they are now.[39]

Let me offer two brief final observations as follows:

First, although I have selected to discuss proselytizing groups that deserve, in my judgment, to be critically opposed because they threaten the very existence of the secular Indian nation-state, this need not mean that any and all varieties of proselytizing are to be opposed. My position is that any and all types of proselytizing, to be sure, deserve rigorous critical appraisal and ought to be held accountable from the perspective of the limits that must be in place for a "civil pluralism" to be politically feasible. This leaves open the possibility, however, that at least some variet-

ies of proselytizing, possibly many varieties, may be welcome voices within the "public square" precisely because they authentically operate within the parameters of a consensual "civil pluralism." In this regard, I am inclined to think that Supreme Court Chief Justice A. K. Ray 1977, as quoted earlier, was struggling with an important distinction when he suggested that "conversion," and we might add "proselytizing" to conversion, need not be identical with the notion of "propagation." As the Constitution of India indicates in Article 25: "(1) Subject to public order, morality and health and to the other provisions of this Part, all persons are equally entitled to freedom of conscience and the right freely to profess, practise and propagate religion.**"**

It is plausible to suggest that "to propagate" is simply to nurture, to extend, to disseminate, and to share one's religious insights. Propagation can be construed in the more general sense of persuading others to take one's own religious tradition of practice and profession seriously without necessarily requiring the leaving of one religious tradition for another. It can also be construed in the sense of what is currently known as "discourse ethics" in the work of such theorists as Jurgen Habermas and Karl-Otto Apel, in which individuals and groups within a consensual environment of "civil pluralism" engage in mutually critical communication, attempting always to sort out the residual distortions arising from older parochial prejudices, for the sake of attaining the best possible strategies for dealing with the problems of the present and future.[40] To the extent that Christian, Muslim, Hindu, Buddhist, Jewish, or whatever other, religious traditions, are willing to accept the limits of "civil pluralism" along the lines of pursuing **non-violent conflict resolution** (or peace), **distributive justice**, **cultural pluralism**, and **individual freedom**, then, it seems to me, that such groups would be welcome to propagate their views in the "public square" of contemporary social reality. Perhaps the most obvious current example would be the manner in which the Dalai Lama propagates the claims of the Tibetan Buddhist tradition.

Second, the awareness of what should not be tolerated cuts another way as well, that is, as a critique of current civil society in India. With its vast bibliography on the intricacies of the notion of "secularism" and the endless debates in India among intellectuals in the social sciences about India as a "secular" state, there is one additional reality that should also no longer be tolerated but all too often is ignored or overlooked. That is, of course, the massive lack of distributive justice in India among the minority communities of Muslims, among the communities of Dalits and tribals, and in the segments of Hindu society who feel alienated from Hindu elites, the very communities where dysfunctional proselytizing succeeds. Whether there is sufficient moral passion and the requisite political will, finally, to address this lack of distributive justice, which encompasses nearly half or more of the population of the Indian nation-state, is for the people of India to decide in the very near future.

Notes

1   I would like to thank the Asia Research Institute, National University of Singapore for inviting me to take part in the "Workshop on Proselytizing and the Limits of Religious Pluralism in the Era of Globalization," in Singapore in 2010. While the present paper is in many respect quite different from my original oral presentation, the original idea for this presentation grew out of that workshop.

2   Martin Marty, "My Virtue is Better than Your Virtue," public lecture, University of California, Santa Barbara, January 12, 1989, cited in Gerald James Larson, "Contra Pluralism," in *Soundings* 73.2-3 (Summer/Fall 1990), p. 304.

3   In my article mentioned in endnote 2, I argue at length (pp. 308-324) that "pluralism" as a theoretical idea is incoherent when analyzed philosophically and that the notion of "civil pluralism" is at best a political compromise (albeit, of course, an important one). In other words, I argue that it is not theoretically possible to be a "pluralist" intellectually.

4   Jose Casanova, *Public Religions in the Modern World* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), p. 211.

5   *Ibid.*, pp. 211-215.

6   These various types are reasonably self-explanatory with the possible exception of "emissary"-"exemplary." I borrow this particular pair from Max Weber's well-known distinction between two distinct types of "prophecy," that is, "emissary" or those types of prophecy that depend on language and discourse (for example, preaching), in contrast to "exemplary" or those types of prophecy that are exhibited by the behavior of saints, holy persons, monks, and so forth. See H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, eds., *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946, p. 285 and pp. 291ff.

7   Stanley Fish, "One More Time," in G. A. Olson and L. Worsham, eds., *Postmodern Sophistry: Stanley Fish and the Critical Enterprise* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2004), p. 266.

8   *Ibid*., p. 270.

9   Louise Richardson, *What Terrorists Want: Understanding the Enemy, Containing the Threat* (New York: Random House, 2006), p. 61. For a complete or nearly complete list of terrorist groups, see Richardson, What Terrorists Want, p. 11 and pp. 243-53.

10   Paul Freston, *Evangelicals and Politics in Asia, Africa and Latin America* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. x-xi. See also David H. Lumsdaine, ed., *Evangelical Christianity and Democracy in Asia* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. x-xv and 6-42. Also see Peter Berger, "Born-Again Modernity," in *The American Interest*, Vol. IV., No. 6, July/August 2009, 121-27.

11   It should perhaps be noted that statistics regarding group membership are difficult to verify and may be construed variously depending on the assumptions operating in collecting the data. Suffice it to say, however, that there is little doubt that the numbers clearly indicate a remarkable dynamism and growth trajectory for Islamic traditions and Protestant Evangelical traditions.

12   Berger, "Born-Again Modernity," pp. 121-22.

13   Paul Freston, Evangelicals and Politics in Asia, Africa and Latin America, p. 2 repeated in Lumsdaine, Evangelical Christiantiy and Democracy in Asia, p. x (Timothy S. Shah's Preface), and p. 7. Timothy Samual Shah, it should be noted, is the chair of the Project for Evangelical Christianity and Democracy in the Global South, and series editor of the four volumes in the publication series.

14   Berger, "Born Again Modernity," p.121.

15   Richardson, What Terrorists Want, pp. 4-6.

16   Important to recognize, however, is that what appears on the level of surface structure may be quite different on the level of deep structure, to use a metaphor from linguistics as well as geology, and this brings me to a footnote comment about Peter Berger's work. His bias, in my view, in favor of contemporary Evangelicalism leads him, I suspect, to edit out of his narrative one of the most important characteristics of Evangelical religiosity, what Evangelicals like to call "cruci-centrism," the centrality of the crucifixion for Evangelical faith. Evangelical faith, and Christian thought generally, focuses on a founding act of violence, a violence that is nothing less than the death of God inasmuch as Jesus Christ is the incarnation of Almighty God. The founder's death by crucifixion is overcome through the miracle of the resurrection, of course, but the resurrection is not of this world. Jesus, however, will return again to the world in the Second Coming. Whereas conventional institutional Christianity–Roman Catholicism, Orthodox Christianity and Classical Protestantism–for the most part underplay the Second Coming through a kind Weberian "routinization of charisma" in the on-going cycles of the liturgical year, Evangelical groups put special focus on Jesus' triumphant return. How and when that Second Coming will unfold varies among Evangelicals, some being "pre-millennialists," others "post-millennialists," and still others, "a-millennialists." Details, though quite interesting from a theological perspective, need not detain us. The point is that fantasies of violence, and in some instances a literal faith in massive final violence for non-believers, is very much a part of the "supernaturalist understanding" (to use Peter Berger's idiom) of Evangelical movements. The "rapture," the "tribulation," the "Anti-Christ," and the "mark of the beast" (terms derived from New Testament apocalyptic passages: Revelation, Chapters 13 and 20, II Thessalonians, Chapter 2 and I John and II John) are all part of the "cosmic drama of redemption" in which masses of non-believers

will be consigned to everlasting damnation. That fantasies of violence are prominent motifs among Evangelicals, mainly in the United States but throughout the world as well, is evidenced by the popularity of the "Left Behind" books, a series of some sixteen best-selling novels by Tim LaHaye and Jerry B. Jenkins, et al. The series gets its name from the first novel in the sequence, *Left Behind: A Novel of the Earth's Last Days*, in which the "rapture," the "tribulation," the "mark of the beast," and the terrible and vicious destruction that will befall non-believers is described in vivid and gory detail.

17   Paul Freston, "The Changing Face of Christian Proselytization: New Actors from the Global South," in Rosalind I. J. Hackett, ed., *Proselytization Revisited: Rights Talk, Free Markets and Culture Wars* (London: Equinox Publishing, Ltd., 2008), especially section, "Evangelicals and Violence," pp. 124ff.

18   Eliza Griswold, *The Tenth Parallel: Dispatches from the Fault Line between Christianity and Islam* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2010), see especially pp. 25-26, 57-59, and 114-116.

19   Gerald James Larson, *India's Agony Over Religion* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995; Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1997).

20   See, for example, Jagdish Bhagwati, *In Defense of Globalization* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), *passim*, and Roland Robertson, *Globalization: Social Theory And Global Culture* (London: Sage, 1992), *passim*.

21   The best introduction to "world-systems" analysis is Immanuel Wallerstein, *World-Systems Analysis: An Introduction* (Durham and London: Duke Universtiy Press, 2004), pp., 23-41. Regarding the development of our modern "world-system" since 1648, see pp., 42-59.

22   See Larson, India's Agony Over Religion, pp. 191-226.

23   I should perhaps emphasize that unlike many contemporary social scientists in the West and in India, I wish to make a clear distinction between what I would call extremist Sangh Parivar proselytizing and political activities and what can be considered legitimate conservative political activities, typical of the work of such moderate leaders as A. B. Vajpayee and L. K. Advani. In this regard, see my critical review of Martha Nussbaum's *The Clash Within: Democracy, Religious Violence and India's Future* (Harvard, 2007), in the *Journal of the American Academy of Religion*, Volume 27, No. 4, December 2009, pp. 990-93, which, in my view, condemns unfairly all conservative political thought in India, lumping together in an absurd fashion the Sangh Parivar vicious violence against Muslims in Gujarat in 2002 with any and all BJP political activity in India since independence.

24   See notes 10 and 13 above.

25   Rowena Robinson, *Christians of India* (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2003), p. 178. See also her excellent introductory essay on the "history of neglect" of serious social-scientific work on the social anthropology of Christianity in India, pp. 11-33. Finally her discussion on conversion of Dalits is important, pp. 186-205.

26   Sushil J. Aaron, "Emulating Azariah: Evangelicals and Social Change in the Dangs," in Lumsdaine, Evangelical Christianity and Democracy in Asia, pp. 87-129, and see also notes 10 and 13.

27   Sujatha Fernandes, "Ethnicity, Civil Society and the Church: The Politics of Evangelical Christianity in Northeast India, in Lumsdaine, Evangelical Christianityand Democracy in Asia, pp. 91-104, and see also Endnotes 10 and 13.

28   See T. K. Oommen, "The Indianisation of the Church and its Implications," in *Crisis and Contention in Indian Society* (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2005), pp. 127-141.

29   The list that follows may be found in S. Prasannarajan, "The Terrorist: Pronoun of Evil," *India Today International*, January 5, 2009, pp. 28-29. It should be noted, however, that the names of the various organizations change from time to time, as do the designated leaders. A full listing of terrorist "anti-systemic groups," including India and elsewhere, may be found in Louise Richardson, *What Terrorists Want*, p. 12 and pp. 243-253 (the book's Glossary which provides thumbnail descriptions of most groups), and see note 9. See also the

annual listing of terrorist groups by the U.S. Department of State Terrorists List, easily found online, under: <http://www.state.gov/j/ct/list/>, FTOs (Foreign Terrorist Organizations).

30   Government of India. The Constitution of India, Diglot Edition (Hindi and English). The full text in English may be found online:< http://www.cgsird.gov.in/constitution.pdf>.

31   See T. N. Madan, *Images of the World: Essays on Religion, Secularism, and Culture* Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 40.

32   *Ibid*., p. 41.

33   *Ibid*., p. 42.

34   *Ibid*.

35   *Ibid.*

36   *Ibid*.

37   Granville Austin's *The Indian Constitution: Cornerstone of a Nation* (Oxford, 1966), Marc Galanter's *Competing Equalities* (Berkeley, UC Press, 1984) are both cited and discussed in Gerald James Larson, India's Agony Over Religion, pp. 224-26.

38   Michael Walzer, "Governing the Globe," in *Dissent*, Fall 2000, pp. 44-52.

39   T. N. Madan, Images of the World, pp. 43-44.

40   Jurgen Habermas, *The Theory of Communicative Action*. Reason and the Rationalization of Society, Volume One; and Lifeworld and System: A Critique of Functionalist Reason, Volume Two; trans., Thomas McCarthy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1984 and 1987), Volume One, pp. 8-141 and pp. 273-337; Volume Two, pp. 301-403. See also Karl-Otto Apel, *Understanding and Explanation: A Transcendental-Pragmatic Perspective* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1984), passim.

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